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Abstract
The Great Depression in the United States was largely the result of changes in eco-
nomic institutions that lowered the normal or steady-state market hours per person
over 16. The difference in steady-state hours in 1929 and 1939 is over 20 percent.
This is a large number, but differences of this size currently exist across the rich
industrial countries. The somewhat depressed Japanese economy of the 1990s
could very well be the result of workweek length constraints that were adopted in
the early 1990s. These constraints lowered steady-state market hours. The failure
of the Japanese people to display concern with the performance of their economy
suggests that this reduction is what the Japanese people wanted. This is in sharp
contrast with the United States in the 1930s when the American people wanted to
work more.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.The prosperity of the 1920s in the United States was fol-
lowed by the Great Depression in the 1930s. Will the pros-
perity of the 1980s and 1990s be followed by another great
depression in the coming decade? This question is not that
far-fetched.Depressionsarenotathingofthepast.TheJap-
aneseeconomy,forexample,hasbeendepressedfornearly
a decade and is currently operating at a level far below
trend. Argentina experienced a depression in the 1980s ev-
erybitassevereastheoneexperiencedbytheUnitedStates
in the 1930s. The Brazilian economy is currently operating
at a level well below trend and could fall even farther. Em-
pirically,depressionsarenotathingofthepast,andonlyby
understandingwhydepressionsoccurredinthepastisthere
any hope of avoiding them in the future.
Giventheimportanceofunderstandingdepressions,I’m
surprised that Harold Cole and Lee Ohanian (in an article
in this issue of the Quarterly Review) are the ﬁrst to study
the Great Depression systematically from the perspective
of neoclassical growth theory. I’m surprised because econ-
omists use growth theory to study economic growth and
business cycle ﬂuctuations quantitatively and to evaluate
tax policies. Why hasn’t growth theory been used to study
the Great Depression? Perhaps because economists are re-
luctant to use standard theory to study an event that histori-
cally was treated as an aberration defying an equilibrium
explanation.
Cole and Ohanian examine the Great Depression from
theperspective ofgrowth theoryandshow thatgrowth the-
ory cannot account for the Great Depression as a 10-year
economic event. In the process of documenting deviations
from existing theory, they deﬁne what a successful theory
of the Great Depression must explain. Their analysis led
me to conclude that the key to deﬁning and explaining the
Great Depression is the behavior of market hours worked
per adult. (Cole and Ohanian report this measure of labor
input as total hours. Adult is deﬁned as 16 years and older.)
Brieﬂy, market hours worked per adult (from here on, sim-
ply market hours) dipped to 72 percent of their 1929 level
in 1934 and remained low throughout the 1930s. Even in
1939,markethourswerestillonlyabout79percentoftheir
1929 level.
By focusing on the entire decade of the 1930s, Cole
and Ohanian shift the nature of the question from
Why was there such a big decline in output
and employment between 1929 and 1933?
to
Why did the economy remain so depressed
for the entire decade?
In particular, in the 1934–39 period, why didn’t the econ-
omy recover from its depressed level? Cole and Ohanian
show that the standard conjectures put forth to explain the
Great Depression are not consistent with observations. In
the last half of the 1930s, there were no banking crises.
There was no deﬂation. There was a large increase in the
moneysupplyandacorrespondingdropintheinterestrate,
just as the demand-for-money relation predicts. There was
growth in total factor productivity. So why were market
hours still 21 percent below their 1929 level in 1939? Giv-
entheconsiderableevidenceagainsttechnology,monetary,
or banking explanations, I am led, as Cole and Ohanian
are, to the view that there must have been a fundamental
change in labor market institutions and industrial policies
that lowered steady-state, or normal, market hours.
1
Growth Theory
Before I explain why I think the behavior of market hours
is the key to explaining the Great Depression, a brief re-
view of growth theory is in order. The now-textbook the-
ory includes two basic decisions. One is the consumption-
investment decision, in which investment is roundabout
consumption. That is, investment in moremachines, office
buildings, and factories today enhances future production
possibilities, permitting greater consumption in the future.
This feature of the production technology provides a way
to transform consumption today into consumption in the
future. Less consumption and more investment today can
increase consumption in the future. The other decision is
the labor-leisure decision.( Leisure is shorthand for pro-
ductive time allocated to nonmarket activities and not lei-
sure in the conventional sense of the word.) More labor
and less leisure today results in more market output today.
This added output can be used for greater consumption to-
day or for greater investment today, which permits greater
consumption in the future.
With growth theory, if technology advances smoothly
and there are no changes in market distortions, the econo-
my grows at a steady rate with constant shares of output
being allocated to consumption and investment and a con-
stant fraction of time being allocated to the market. The
theory predicts the consequences of changes that affect the
constraints people face. Such changes would include, for
example, a change in the tax system, a change in technolo-
gy, a change in the price of imported goods relative to do-
mestically produced goods, or a change in regulations or
laws.
Growth theory without the labor-leisure decision was
developed to account for secular growth. With the natural
extension to include the labor-leisure decision, the theory
has proved successful in accounting for phenomena other
than what it was designed to explain. For example, the the-
ory predicts well the behavior of the U.S. economy during
World War II. (See Braun and McGrattan 1993.) This sur-
prised a lot of economists, because the general view was
that patriotism was needed to explain employment and
output behavior during World War II. This successful pre-
diction of the consequences of a large public ﬁnance shock
is reassuring for the theory.
Another dramatic empirical success of growth theory is
in the study of business cycle ﬂuctuations. The developers
of growth theory thought the theory would be useful for
studying long-term growth issues but that a fundamentally
different theory would be needed for studying business
cycle ﬂuctuations. Once the implications of growth theory
were derived, however, business cycle ﬂuctuations turned
outtobewhatthetheorypredicts.(SeePrescott1986.)The
theory can answer such business cycle questions as, How
volatile would the economy be if total factor productivi-
ty–growth shocks were the only disturbance?
The Great Depression and business cycles are similar
in that both include variations in output accounted for in
large part by variations in labor input to production. The
Great Depression and business cycles are fundamentally
different in terms of magnitude and persistence. The Great
Depression was nearly an order of magnitude bigger than
typical business cycles and lasted a decade rather than ayear or two. However, magnitude and persistence are not
the fundamental difference. To explain the fundamental
difference, I’ll ﬁrst explain what business cycles are.
Essentially, business cycles are responses to persistent
changes, or shocks, that shift the constant growth path of
the economy up or down. This constant growth path is the
path to which the economy would converge if there were
no subsequent shocks. If a shock shifts the constant growth
pathdown,theeconomyrespondsasfollows.Markethours
fall, reducing output; a bigger share of output is allocated
to consumption and a smaller share to investment; and
more time is allocated to leisure. Over time, market hours
return to normal, as do investment and consumption shares
of output, as the economy converges to its new lower con-
stant growth path. The level of the new path is lower, not
the growth rate along the path.
I’ve just described the response of the economy to a
single shock. In fact, the economy is continually hit by
shocks, and what economists observe in business cycles is
the effects of past and current shocks. A bust occurs if a
number of negative shocks are bunched in time. A boom
occurs if a number of positive shocks are bunched in time.
Business cycles are, in the language of Slutzky (1937), the
“sum of random causes.”
The fundamental difference between the Great Depres-
sion and business cycles is that market hours did not return
to normal during the Great Depression. Rather, market
hours fell and stayed low. In the 1930s, labor market insti-
tutions and industrial policy actions changed normal mar-
ket hours. I think these institutions and actions are what
caused the Great Depression.
Declines in Market Hours
Cole and Ohanian report that market hours declined 21
percent between 1929 and 1939. Given this change in nor-
mal market hours, growth theory predicts the behavior of
investment and employment that occurred in the 1930s. In
particular, the theory predicts an extended period of a low
investment share of output in response to this change in
market hours. In the 1929–39 period, net investment—new
production of capital goods less capital goods consumed
in the process of production—was close to zero. Growth
theory also predicts that during the early periods after
changes have reduced normal market hours, employment
will be below the new lower normal level. The U.S. econ-
omy in the 1930s conforms well to these predictions of
the theory.
Growth theory, however, does not explain why normal
market hours changed so much during the 1930s in the
United States. My view is that the explanation of why mar-
ket hours changed is the explanation of the Great Depres-
sion.
Perhaps examining the data for other countries will help
explain the change in market hours in the United States
during the 1930s. The problem is that good data on market
hours for most countries between World War I and World
War II do not exist or are difficult to obtain. One country
for which the needed data are available is France. (See the
Appendix.)
Like the U.S. economy, the French economy boomed
during the 1920s and experienced a depression in the
1930s. As in the United States, market hours in France
declined about 22 percent between 1929 and 1939, while
trend-corrected productivity did not change. However,
there is one important difference between the U.S. and
French economies in the 1930s. Output in the United
States declined more than 25 percent between 1929 and
1933, while output declined less than 15 percent in
France. The French experience is more in line with the
prediction of growth theory. The difference between the
French and U.S. experiences indicates that some factor or
factors not present in the French economy must have
disrupted the U.S. economy in the early 1930s. This dif-
ference is of the business cycle variety because it was not
highly persistent. This business cycle disruption to the
U.S. economy in the early 1930s, though interesting and
important, is a second-order factor. I think Cole and
Ohanian are right that the big question is, Why were
market hours still so low in 1939?
These observations on the Great Depression suggest
that examining the behavior of other economies on the di-
mension of market hours is in order. I am not concerned
with temporary low (high) employment associated with
convergence of the capital stock down (up) to its constant
growth path, which is what business cycles are all about.
I am concerned with highly persistent differences in nor-
mal market hours.
Thedifferencebetweenthe1929U.S.economyandthe
1939 U.S. economy is not unparalleled. In the 1939 U.S.
economy, market hours are about 21 percent lower than
market hours in the 1929 U.S. economy. Trend-corrected
total factor productivity is about the same in both econo-
mies.Thedifferencebetweentheseeconomiesisverysim-
ilar to the difference between the current French and U.S.
economies. Currently in France, market hours are 25 per-
cent lower than market hours in the United States, while
output per hour is essentially the same in both countries.
This observation implies that France is now in a depres-
sion.
In fact, France is very concerned with its current low
employment and perceives it as a problem. French econ-
omists are not arguing that France can solve its low em-
ployment problem by spending more or printing more
money. Virtually all agree that the French employment
problem is due to features of France’s labor market insti-
tutions and industrial policies. Exactly what the problems
are with current institutions and policies and what should
be done are the questions that need to be answered if
France is to solve its low employment problem.
Spainhasanevenbiggeremploymentproblem.Market
hours in Spain today are 40 percent lower than market
hours in the United States, while output per hour is essen-
tially the same in both countries. (See the Appendix.) I
think these comparisons establish that labor market in-
stitutions and industrial policies can have large conse-
quences for normal market hours.
After the 1930s, market hours increased only gradually
in the United States. Apparently, many of the changes that
lowered steady-state market hours persisted. Only in the
1980s did market hours return to their 1929 level. The ac-
companyingtablereportsmarkethoursat10-yearintervals
from 1929 to 1979 in the United States. It’s interesting that
market hours in 1949 are only slightly higher than market
hoursin 1939, whilethe investment shareof outputhad re-
turned to normal. Growth theory predicts the return of the
investmentsharetonormal,becauseby1949,theeconomy
hadessentiallyconvergedtoitsnewlowerconstantgrowthpath. However, given that market hours were still low in
1959, the U.S. economy was still depressed in 1959. Be-
tween 1931 and 1959, only during wartime when public
consumption is temporarily high, was the U.S. economy
not depressed.
An Application of Growth Theory:
Japan in the 1990s
The depressed Japanese economy is a topic of concern to-
dayinWashingtonandothercapitalsthroughouttheworld.
U.S. and European top government officials are making an
abundance of recommendations as to what Japan should
do. Most of these recommendations are not based on es-
tablished theory or even a careful examination of the data
from the perspective of growth theory. An application of
growth theory to the current situation in Japan might be
useful in understanding the Great Depression in the United
States.
The current situation in Japan is as follows. Output per
adult in Japan is well below trend—exactly how far is hard
to say. If the growth rate that characterized the 1980s had
continued in the 1990s, output is now about 20 percent be-
low trend. (See the Appendix.) Contrary to what others
have suggested, I don’t think the principal reason for this
low level of output is that the Japanese banking system is
in need of reform. I think the principal reason is that Japan
chosetoreducemarkethours.Intheearly1990s,thework-
week in Japan was reduced by law ﬁrst from 48 hours to
44 and then from 44 hours to 40. These reductions are im-
portantinaccountingforthe12.5percentdeclineinmarket
hours in Japan in the 1990–97 period. Even with these re-
ductions, market hours in Japan are still high by interna-
tional standards. In 1997, market hours were 10 percent
higher in Japan than in the United States.
GiventhechangeinJapaneselawandtheresultingdrop
in normal market hours, growth theory predicts the almost
stagnantoutputoftheJapaneseeconomyinthe1990s.This
reduction in market hours lowered the marginal product of
capital, making investment unproﬁtable. Given the lack of
proﬁtable domestic investment opportunities, the Japanese
began saving by investing abroad. This explains Japan’s
large trade surpluses. The fact that the Japanese people do
not appear to be that upset about the performance of their
economysuggeststhatperhapswhathashappenedinJapan
in the 1990s is what the Japanese people wanted.
The Japanese economy in the 1990s is not as depressed
as the U.S. economy was in the 1930s. Market hours in
Japan in the 1990s have fallen only half as much as market
hours fell in the United States during the Great Depression.
More importantly, the reduction in market hours in Japan
in the 1990s was the stated objective of policy. In the
1930s in the United States, the concern was that people
were working too little. In the early 1990s in Japan, the
concern was that people were working too much. Policy
changes reﬂected that concern.
Once data are available for the late 1990s, I’ll be inter-
ested to see if my conjecture about the Japanese economy
is correct. That is, are market hours the key to explaining
the depressed Japanese economy? Moreover, are changes
in market institutions and industrial policies the key to ex-
plaining changes in market hours?
Concluding Comments
From the perspective of growth theory, the Great Depres-
sion is a great decline in steady-state market hours. I think
this great decline was the unintended consequenceof labor
market institutions and industrial policies designed to im-
prove the performance of the economy. Exactly what
changes in market institutions and industrial policies gave
rise to the large decline in normal market hours is not
clear. But, then, neither is it clear why market hours are so
low in France and Spain today.
The Marxian view is that capitalistic economies are
inherently unstable and that excessive accumulation of
capital will lead to increasingly severe economic crises.
Growth theory, which has proved to be empirically suc-
cessful, says this is not true. The capitalistic economy is
stable, and absent some change in technology or the rules
of the economic game, the economy converges to a con-
stant growth path with the standard of living doubling
every 40 years. In the 1930s, there was an important
change in the rules of the economic game. This change
loweredthesteady-statemarkethours.TheKeynesianshad
it all wrong. In the Great Depression, employment was not
low because investment was low. Employment and in-
vestment were low because labor market institutions and
industrial policies changed in a way that lowered normal
employment.
*The author thanks Franck Portier, Fumio Hayashi, and Jesús Fernández-Villa-
verde for providing references to, respectively, the French, Japanese, and Spanish data.
The author thanks Harold Cole, Robert E. Lucas, Jr., and, in particular, Lee Ohanian,
for comments. In addition, the author thanks Daria Zakharova for excellent research
assistance and the National Science Foundation for ﬁnancial support.
†Also, Professor, University of Chicago.
1Lucas and Rapping (1972) come to similar conclusions. Their theory, based on
monetary surprises, predicts the large decline in employment in the 1929–33 period.
As Lucas and Rapping (1972) emphasize, their theory does not account for the failure
of the economy to recover in the 1934–39 period.
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Data Sources
France Population: Bilan Démographique 1995, no. 428, Fevrier 1996
http://www.insee.fr
GDP and Employment: OECD Main Economic Indicators,
September 1998, p. 122
Data Series: http://www.cepii.fr/SERLONG.HTM
Japan GDP 1990: OECD Main Economic Indicators, December 1994, p. 118
GDP 1997: OECD Main Economic Indicators, January 1998, p. 76
PPP 1990: OECD Main Economic Indicators, October 1998, p. 223




Spain GDP, Hours, Population, and Employment:




GDP for 1919: Romer 1989
GDP for other years: U.S. Department of Commerce,
Survey of Current Business, August 1997
Hours 1919–39: Kendrick 1961
Hours 1949–79:
Nonagricultural Hours: U.S. Department of Commerce,
Survey of Current Business, August 1997
Agricultural Hours: 1997 Economic Report of the President,









*Adult = 16 years and older.
†For 1929 and 1939, hours are Kendrick’s (1961) estimates multiplied by 0.897.
With this adjustment, Kendrick’s series equals the value of the modern series used in 1948.
The year 1948 is the earliest nonrecession year for which both series are available.
Sources: See the Appendix.